Ukraine war shows NATO’s biggest problem isn’t its strategy, think tank argues

• The Ukraine war is a wake-up call for NATO to stockpile more ammunition.

• NATO states need more ammo and defense production to replace losses in a long war.

• Powers like Russia and China have invested in huge numbers of artillery.

The Ukraine war shows that the theory behind NATO’s combat doctrine is sound. The problem is that Britain and many other NATO allies lack the resources to implement it, a new report argues.

There is not “compelling evidence to suggest that the war necessitates fundamental changes to key ideas and terms in UK or Allied joint operational-level doctrine, such as the maneuverist approach, the comprehensive approach or mission command,” according to the RAND Europe think tank, which reviewed open-source literature on the Ukraine war at the behest of the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defense. The report counters other experts who’ve argued that the West’s maneuver strategy for ground combat faces increasing threats.

But to win a large conflict like Ukraine, NATO lacks sufficient equipment and ammunition. The Ukraine war has been marked by heavy losses of armored vehicles and artillery, as well as massive expenditure of munitions that have strained the economies of the combatants. NATO stockpiles and defense manufacturing capacity had already dwindled after the end of the Cold War: providing a steady supply of armaments to Ukraine while replenishing their stockpiles has proven extremely challenging.

“The published literature on Ukraine suggests that the most pressing question is not whether NATO and the UK’s joint doctrine is appropriate, but rather whether sufficient resources are available to credibly implement those ideas and principles as envisaged, especially over the course of a long war,” RAND warned.

Ukraine is a conflict of contradictions, where 21st-century technologies such as drones exist alongside artillery barrages and trench warfare straight from 1917. While militaries want to learn the lessons for future wars, distinguishing what’s old from what’s new — and what are specific features of the Ukraine war versus permanent trends — isn’t easy.

For example, what is the future of airpower? Crewed aircraft have had a surprisingly limited impact on the Ukraine war, as have helicopters. “The deployment of [ground-based air defenses] has underscored the poor survivability of rotary-wing assets on both sides, with a reduced use of platforms including helicopters for tactical air mobility maneuvers and [casualty evacuation], compared with operations in Afghanistan and Iraq,” RAND said. The sheer numbers and accuracy of air defenses like the Patriot (Ukraine) or S-300 and S-400s (Russia) force jets to fly at a remove from the battlefield, one of the reasons the battlefield’s lines are largely static.

These issues are hardly academic for NATO militaries. They operate the world’s most numerous and advanced air forces, outgrowths from the Cold War strategy of using tactical airpower to stall and fracture the Soviet Union’s numerically superior ground forces. If their use is now much more limited, it suggests NATO armies will face a much more difficult ground fight.

Drones have largely replaced crewed aircraft for reconnaissance and attack missions. And, small, expendable drones have replaced larger UAVs such as the Turkish-made Bayraktar 2 strike drone that Ukraine used with devastating effect in the early days of the war. Yet massive use of drones has failed to provide either side with victory.

Ukraine has tried to shed its Soviet-era doctrine in favor of Western-style maneuver warfare, with limited but not decisive success. Russia has used massive artillery barrages and human-wave assaults — the same tactics the Red Army used against the Germans in World War II — to achieve steady but incremental gains at ferocious cost; by one estimate, November was the highest month for Russian soldiers killed and wounded in the entire war.

“Without airpower, neither maneuver nor positional warfare have led to a decisive strategic outcome, but claims in the literature about the demise of such approaches are premature,” said RAND.

The apparent neutralization of airpower is bad news for NATO. Western nations have tended to invest in aircraft rather than building huge numbers of artillery pieces, as Russia and China have done.

RAND does see several enduring lessons of the Ukraine war for NATO. One is having adequate quantities of personnel and material to absorb and replenish the constant drain of combat losses in a long war. “While the efficiency afforded by new technology can offset the need for mass in certain situations, it cannot replace the general need for mass. We have not yet observed any game-changing technology or tactic that negates the need for critical mass in personnel, infrastructure, materiel and stockpiles.”

These issues are especially acute for the UK. The British Army is shrinking to 72,000 soldiers — its lowest level since the Napoleonic Wars — while the Royal Navy and Air Force are also a fraction of their Cold War strength. In the event of a war with Russia, such as an invasion of Poland or Eastern Europe, the UK might barely be able to scrape together a full-strength mechanized division.

The RAND study also examines how military power emerges from more than just weapons and strategy. For example, the Kremlin’s worst error was to underestimate the resolve of the Ukrainian people and government to preserve their independence as a nation. “The war has re-emphasized the importance of a narrative and audience-centric approaches. This includes the crucial but often overlooked role of a national will to fight — a topic extensively analyzed at RAND but often overlooked, especially in Western defense establishments.^“

Perhaps the biggest lesson of the Ukraine war is the importance of adaptability. Ukraine and Russia have proven rigid in some ways, but quite adaptable in others, such as mastering the use of drones. “Technological trends towards automation, process optimization and a more transparent, networked and data-rich battlespace aside, the war has for example reiterated the enduring impact of uncertainty and friction in complicating operations,” RAND said.

This means NATO must constantly reassess its doctrine. The Ukraine war “emphasizes the crucial distinction between innovation (combining old with new) vs adaptation (to counter the enemy’s new tactics) and the need to promote both (not necessarily prioritizing the new),” RAND concluded.

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.

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